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Abstract—Physical Unclonable functions (PUFs) have appeared
as a promising solution to provide security in hardware. SRAM
PUFs offer the advantage, over other PUF constructions, of re-
using resources (memories) that already exist in many designs.
However, their intrinsic noisy nature produces the so called bit
flipping effect, which is a problem in circuit identification and se-
cret key generation. The approaches reported to reduce this effect
usually resort to the use of pre- and post-processing steps (such
as Fuzzy Extractor structures combined with Error Correcting
Codes), which increase the complexity of the system. This paper
proposes a pre-processing step that reduces bit flipping problems
without increasing the hardware complexity. The proposal has
been verified experimentally with 90-nm SRAMs included in
digital application specific integrated circuits (ASICs).
Index Terms—SRAM PUFs, hardware security, IC identifica-
tion
I. INTRODUCTION
PHysical Unclonable Functions [1] have appeared as apromising solution to obtain identifiers (IDs) and cryp-
tographic keys to be used in hardware security applications.
They exploit fabrication process variability that makes each
device unique and difficult to be cloned. The idea is to map
a set of challenges to a set of responses that can only be
evaluated with the original physical system. Different types of
PUFs have been reported along last decades [2]. In SRAM-
based PUFs, the challenges are the memory cells to be read
and the responses are the start-up values provided by those
cells. SRAM PUFs are based on cross-coupled circuits (CMOS
inverters) that, once powered up, have two different stable
operating points and one unstable point. If the memory cell
is not driven by any input, the slight differences (threshold
voltage mismatching) between the two ideally symmetrical
parts (the inverters) motivate the cell to go more often to one
of the stable states. Every memory cell yields one response
bit that can be used to generate the bit string of an ID
or a cryptographic key. The advantage of SRAM PUFs is
that SRAMs already exist in most of digital designs. First
implementations of SRAM PUFs were directed to be used in
FPGAs [3]. Lately, their use has been reported in 65- and 90-
nm integrated circuits [4][5]. The behavior of SRAM cells has
been studied to generate true random numbers, identifiers, and
secret keys for cryptographic algorithms [3]-[6].
In order to use PUFs for IDs or secret key generation,
some statistical requirements should be met to ensure enough
level of uniqueness (for security) and reproducibility (for
reliability). These requirements can be established by means
of the following measures:
• The inter-class Hamming Distance (HD), which represents
the difference between two n-bit responses (R and R’) of
different PUFs to the same challenge. This distance measures
the PUF uniqueness. It can be expressed as follows:
Fractional inter − class−HD = HD(R,R
′)
n
(1)
• The intra-class Hamming Distance (HD), which represents
the difference between two n-bit responses (Ri and Rj) of one
PUF to the same challenge. This distance measures the PUF
reliability. It can be described as follows:
Fractional intra− class−HD = HD(Ri, Rj)
n
(2)
Ideally, for IDs and secret key generation, fractional inter-
class Hamming Distances should be 0.5 and intra-class Ham-
ming Distances should be 0. However, the intrinsic noisy
nature of PUFs causes that the bits provided by the PUF are
not always the same but change under the same challenge
from one use to another, which is known as bit flipping
effect [4] [5]. This is a problem because it decreases both
the intended reliability and uniqueness. In order to solve it,
several approaches have been reported in the literature. Post-
processing steps, such as the use of Fuzzy Extractor or Helper
Data algorithms are employed in [3] [7], the latter work also
including a pre-processing step in order to obtain and store
the error probability of each bit. Such steps increase the
complexity and cost of the resulting hardware. Other works,
such as [8], propose the use of specific SRAM bitcells, which
require full-custom schemes instead of exploiting conventional
SRAMs.
This work presents the test of PUFs based on TSMC 90-
nm low power dual-port SRAMs embedded into an integrated
circuit designed to nonlinear control applications. Bit flipping
effect is analyzed as well as the sensitivity of SRAM PUF
response to temperature and power supply variations. A pre-
processing step that does not require additional hardware nor
specific SRAM bitcells is proposed to reduce the bit flipping
problem. The paper is structured as follows. Section II is ded-
icated to briefly describe evaluation of SRAM PUFs in TSMC
90-nm ASICs. Section III proposes a procedure to reduce bit
flipping problems in SRAM PUFs. Finally conclusions are
presented in Section IV.
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Figure 1. Bit flipping effect measured on 168-bit responses
II. EVALUATION OF TSCM 90-NM SRAM PUFS IN ASICS
As many other digital integrated circuits, an ASIC devoted
to nonlinear control (designed by some of the authors) includes
embedded SRAMs as building blocks of its architecture. In
particular, the ASICs tested in this work include TSMC 90-
nm low-power dual-port SRAMs to program the parameters
that define the nonlinear control law provided as output. The
ASIC has been designed in such a way that allows exploiting
the SRAM blocks as SRAM PUFs that generate bitstrings
to given challenges based on power-up values characteristics
of the memory cells. Hence, different evaluations have been
carried out, described in the following.
The bit flipping effect has been measured on 20 ASIC
samples. The 168 bits provided by 14 words of 12 bits have
been registered from the SRAM when the IC was powered
up. The measurements have been performed 20 times with
each sample, with different values of temperature and voltage
supply. As claimed in [6], SRAM is subject to a phenomenom
known as data remanence, which means that the memory
retains its content during several seconds after being powered-
down. In our analysis, in order to ensure the lost of any
previously stored data in the SRAM, the samples were kept
unpowered during time intervals that ranged from 25 to 30
seconds. Figure 1 summarizes the percentages of IC samples
versus the percentages of bits that change from one measure-
ment to another (taken the first measurement as reference). It
can be seen how temperature has more influence than power
supply on bit flipping. Ideally for generating identifiers and
secret keys, bit flipping should be 0%. In the measurements
shown in Figure 1, up to 33 % of the bits may suffer from bit
flipping.
As happens in biometric identification of persons, certain
level of noise is allowed in the identifiers. A commonly used
metric to determine the quality of a biometric identification
process is to evaluate the values of the False Acceptation Rate
(FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR). The ideal situation is
to find a threshold so that both FAR and FRR are zero. The
20 measurements of 168 bits provided by the SRAM PUFs in
the 20 ICs working in the nominal case of 25°C and 1.2V of
Vdd have been processed to obtain the FAR and FRR curves
and the distribution of the genuine and fake populations, as
shown in Figure 2.
To better characterize the use of SRAM PUFs for chip
identification, the influence of different power supply and
temperature conditions has been analyzed.
A. Power supply variations influence
The effect of the power supply variations over the SRAM
start-up values was measured in the 20 ICs organized in three
groups. The 168 bits of each SRAM PUF were measured
20 times for each Vdd value (the temperature was fixed to
the nominal value). Groups and Vdd values defined were the
following:
• First group (8 ICs): ICs at seven Vdd values between
1.1*Vdd and 0.9*Vdd: 1.32V, 1.28V, 1.24V, 1.2V, 1.16V,
1.12V, and 1.08V.
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Figure 2. For IDs of 168 bits and nominal situation: (a) Genuine and fake
populations. (b) False Acceptation Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR)
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Figure 3. Influence of power supply and temperature variations in the
identification reliability for IDs of: (a) 168 bits, and (b) 36 bits
• Second group (7 ICs): ICs at five Vdd values between
1.1*Vdd and 0.9*Vdd: 1.32V, 1.26V, 1.2V, 1.14V, and
1.08V.
• Third group (5 ICs): ICs at three Vdd values between
1.1*Vdd and 0.9*Vdd: 1.32V, 1.2V, and 1.08V.
The influence over the intra-class Hamming Distance can
be seen in the curve labelled as ’IntraVdd’ in Figure 3a.
Comparing the results with those obtained at nominal Vdd
(curve labelled as ’IntrNom in Figure 3a), it can be observed
that the power supply variations have almost no effect over the
reliability of the identification system . This is quite interesting
because in other types of PUFs, such as Ring Oscillator-
based elements, the influence of power supply variations is
determinant (they even mask the variation process effect, as
reported in [9]).
B. Temperature variations influence
Temperature effects over the start-up values were measured
at five different temperatures: 5°C, 25°C, 50°C, and 75°C
(fixing the power supply to the nominal value). As in the
previous case, 20 measurements of 168 bits of the 20 ICs
were recorded at each temperature. The curve labelled as
’IntraTemp’ in Figure 3a shows how temperature variation
has a higher impact over the reliability than Vdd variation.
Lower temperatures are preferred to higher ones to make the
identification process more reliable.
C. Influence of the ID length
Reducing the ID length has several advantages. First of all,
as the ID is formed by the consecutive reading of different
memory addresses, if the length is reduced then the time
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Fractional Hamming Distance 
P e
r c
e
n
t
 
 
Intra
Inter
(a)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0
20
40
60
80
100
Threshold Hamming Distance
P e
r c
e n
t
 
 
FRR
FAR
(b)
Figure 4. For IDs of 36 bits and nominal situation: (a) Genuine and fake
populations. (b) False Acceptation Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR)
required for generating the ID is shorter (reading each address
requires at least two clock cycles). Secondly, the addresses em-
ployed for identification should remain uninitialized until the
ID is generated, and cannot be employed for other purposes,
as claimed in [6]. In the other hand, if the length of the ID
decreases, the reliability of the identification process decreases
also. This is illustrated in Fig. 3b and Figure 4. Comparing
Figure 4 and Figure 2, it can be seen how reducing the ID
length translates into genuine and fake populations that are
closer. illustrates this effect when 36 instead of 168 bits are
employed.
III. PROPOSAL TO REDUCE BIT FLIPPING
In the searching for an effective way to reduce the bit
flipping present in our system, the start-up values provided
for each SRAM cell were analyzed in detail considering the
different operating conditions. In a first study, the bit-string
outputs of the SRAM PUFs were considered as the grouping
of 14 words read from the memory. A media of 2 out of the
14 words (total of 24 out of the 168 bits) has been observed
to have all their bits stable (they do not flip) for different
measurements, for a range of temperatures between 5 and
50°C and allowing Vdd variations of +/-10%. This means that
by selecting properly the words used to form the identifier,
the bit flipping can be decreased considerable or even being
removed.
In order to illustrate the importance of a good selection of
the memory words to read, three IDs of 36 bits have been
analyzed. In the best case (these results are labelled as ’BC’
in Figure 5), the ID is formed with the 3 “best” (most stable)
memory words. In the worst case (these results are labelled as
’BC’ in Figure 5), the ID is formed with the 3 “worst” (least
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Figure 5. Fake_Genuine and FAR_FRR curves for different selections of
the 36 bits for the ID
stable) memory words. In a random case, the ID is formed
with 3 randomly selected memory words (these results are
labelled as ’Nom’ in Figure 5. The FAR and FRR curves
as well as the fake and genuine populations for the three
selections can be compared in Figure 5. It can be seen how
the bit flipping reduction obtained by selecting the best words
improves the reliability of the identification process because a
bigger interval of fractional Hamming Distances can be used
as threshold that ensures a zero FAR and FRR. On the contrary,
if the worst case is selected, the fake and genuine populations
are closer and the probability of error in the chip identification
increases.
In applications related to ASIC identification, certain
amount of bit flipping can be allowed, but in the case of
key generation systems, zero bit flipping is required. In our
analysis, zero bit flipping is achieved by considering only 1
out of the 14 words considered. In any case, there are two
possibilities to obtain a very low bit flipping: to analyze more
memory words until obtaining more zero bit-flipping addresses
or to study the bits of the SRAM words independently. The
latter analysis has been done in two steps: firstly, the most
stable addresses have been found, and from them, only the
stable bits have been selected. The result has been that a media
of 10 out of the 12 bits in the most stable addresses do not flip
in any situation. Hence, bit strings with even zero bit flipping
can be obtained.
In both cases (selecting stable words or selecting stable bits),
the selecting process determine adequate challenges for the
SRAM PUFs and nothing has to be stored in the ASIC, which
differs from the proposal in [7]. Selecting process is done as a
pre-processing step during the enrollment phase and previously
to use the ASIC (with its SRAM PUF) in its application field.
This analysis, which can be easily automated, could be done
by the ASIC manufacturers together with other testing proofs
that are carried out to evaluate the performance of the ASIC.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This work shows how it is possible to reduce bit flipping
in SRAM PUFs even to the point of obtaining zero bit
flipping by carrying out a characterization of the SRAM words
(and even bits) that are read to form the output bit strings.
The characterization is performed as a pre-processing step
previously to use the circuit in its application field, without
the need of extra hardware to be included in the ASIC.
The advantages of this proposal are illustrated in the case
of integrated circuit identification with experimental results
of TSMC 90-nm SRAMs embedded into ASICs devoted to
nonlinear control applications.
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